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The Spanish and Catalan governments have been engaged in a dispute over a proposal to hold a
referendum on Catalonia’s independence from Spain on 9 November. Luis Moreno writes on the
social attitudes underpinning the debate in Catalonia. He notes that against the backdrop of the
financial crisis and the opposition of the central Spanish authorities to holding a referendum, the
percentage of Catalans expressing an exclusive Catalan identity has risen significantly in recent
years.
Catalan authorities (parliament, government, local councils) have promoted the “official” celebration
of a consultation on independence for 9 November. However this proposal was changed
significantly on 14 October and the referendum will not take place in its original form, in compliance with a resolution
by the Spanish Constitutional Court putting a halt to the popular consultation. The highest tribunal and interpreter of
Spain’s constitutional order had ruled that the referendum does not comply with the provisions of the 1978
Constitution and related legislation.
Very much against the expectations created in the old Catalan Principality, a referendum like the one held in
Scotland on 18 September will therefore not occur. In the event that the Catalan government of the Generalitat, and
the local councils, went ahead with its original decision, the referendum outcome would generate notable
uncertainty. An act of civil disobedience by refusing to comply with the decision of the Constitutional Court would
most probably meet with the reaction of Spain’s rule of law, perhaps by means of suspending certain activities of
Catalonia’s government. If the consultation is carried out “unofficially”, it would have no formal consequences, but
would certainly feed into the on-going discussion about the possible secession of Catalonia from the rest of Spain.
Social attitudes and Catalan independence
The social attitudes underpinning Catalonia’s referendum conundrum swing between the ancestral Catalans’ seny
(common sense) and rauxa (outburst). If the former implies sensibleness and a well-reasoned perception of
situations, the latter compels the adoption of direct action when it is felt that no other course of action is more
effective. In other areas of Spain, the popular term justicia catalana refers to the untangling of situations of perceived
unfairness by the recourse to personal agency and, ultimately, force.
Within the present context of centre-periphery confrontation, it would be misleading not to mention the recurrent
adoption in contemporary times of the centralist so-called trágala (swallow it) practices. These were often imposed
by weak – and generally despotic – Spanish governments upon the aspirations channelled by Catalan elites to be a
community on its own, politically differentiated from the rest of Spain.
The historical background here is that following the civilWar of the Spanish Succession  and the surrender in
Catalonia of the Archduke Charles of Austria s troops on September 11, 1714, to those of the Bourbon Philip V, the
Principality’s self-governing institutions and its political rights which originated in medieval times were cancelled.
Unlike the process of decline experienced by Spain during the 19th and 20th centuries, the Principat de Catalunya
witnessed both unprecedented cultural revival and economic growth. Very much like the symbolic date of 1314
(Bannockburn) for the Scots, 1714 has been made to represent a historical yardstick for Catalan contemporary
nationalists. They have pressed to “regain” Catalonia’s independence three hundred years later. As in Scotland, the
Catalan case underlines the political salience that symbolism and the recreation of history have for present-day
social mobilisation.
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Supporters of Catalan independence on 11 September 2014, Credit: Eric
Burniche (CC-BY-SA-3.0)
A further attitudinal element which helps to explain the
proportions and intensity of the late quest for
independence concerns the so-called “demonstration
effect”. After the massive popular demonstrations in the
streets of Barcelona on the Diada (National Day – 11
September) in recent years, large sections of the
Catalan population have internalised the prospect of
having their own state on equal terms as, say, France,
Norway or Spain itself. The popular drive behind such
an aspiration was greatly fuelled by the repercussions of
the 2008 economic crisis, which provided secessionist
advocates with a “window of opportunity” to make the
argument that Espanya ens roba (Spain robs us).
The allegation that with independence the Catalans
would be richer than “lazy and thieving” Spaniards was
reiterated constantly. The final assumption was based
upon a conviction that the goal of independence was
attainable, depending only upon the people’s will and
determination. Such a popular will must also be
influenced by the latest developments concerning the public confession made by Jordi Pujol, President of the
Generalitat during 1980-2003 and father figure of contemporary Catalan nationalism, that he had been hiding money
and assets abroad from Spain’s tax authorities.
Catalan independence campaigners have deployed an effective strategy of mobilisation by which the in-group
(Catalonia) is kept highly motivated in its dispute with the out-group (Spain). All is aimed at maintaining the self-
affirmative popular compulsion of ‘Yes, we can’ for the achievement of independence. Such an approach is in line
with the ‘effects’ theorised by Thorstein Veblen as the best means to overcome unsuccessful attempts in the past,
which can be turned into successful achievements in the future. According to such an understanding, the defeat in
1714 by the Bourbon pretender in the War of Succession can be turned into a victory if Catalans choose to do so.
The belief is that pragmatism can make people, using their agency, shape the institutions of society according to the
wishes.
Unlike the Scots, over recent decades citizens in Catalonia have expressed a high degree of duality when
identifying themselves. In 1986, a survey carried out in Scotland addressing for the first time what later has been
coined as ‘The Moreno Question’, found that 39 per cent of the surveyed people considered themselves to be ‘Only
Scottish’ without any identity sharing with Britain. After all these years, the percentage of ‘exclusivity’ in Scotland has
remained rather stable with a slight increase in recent times. As shown in the Table below, in 1985, around 9 per
cent of the people in Catalonia stated their ‘exclusive identity’. The assumption behind the formulation of ‘The
Moreno Question’ was that when citizens in stateless nations such as Catalonia or Scotland identify themselves in
an exclusive manner (“Only Catalan”; “Only Scottish”), the institutional outcome of this form of singular identification
would also be exclusive. Demands for self-government would evolve towards claims of a right for independence and
secession.
Table: Responses in Catalonia to the question: “In which of these five categories do you include yourself?”
(1985 and 2013)
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Note: Figures have been rounded to nearest full percentage. In 2013 there were 2 per cent of
don’t know/refused responses. Figures from the two surveys are provided together for
illustrative purposes only. Sources: Moreno, Luis (1986), PhD thesis, Decentralisation in
Britain and Spain: The cases of Scotland and Catalonia, p. 68 (1985); and Centre d’Estudis
d’Opinió (2013).
In the midst of the economic crisis and after the ruling of the Spanish Constitutional Court in 2010 – which was
interpreted as a setback for Catalonia’s home rule aspirations – the percentage of those considering themselves as
‘Only Catalan’ rose significantly. According to the Barometer carried out in November 2013 by Generalitat´s Centre
of Opinion Studies, 31 per cent of Catalans felt “Only Catalan”, more than three times the percentage recorded in
the mid-1980s. It can be easily deduced from these figures that the increase in Catalans’ exclusive self-identification
has been mainly contingent on circumstances and has grown rapidly in recent times. Greater numbers of Catalans
have internalised the refusal of the Spanish central elites and, in particular, the rejection by the central Conservative
Rajoy Government in 2012 to negotiate new financial arrangements, as an unacceptable development.
The need for a political agreement between the Spanish and Catalan governments
All things considered, the major dissimilarity between the Catalan and Scottish cases concerns the disparity in the
formulation and organisation of their respective referendums. Alex Salmond and David Cameron, on behalf of both
the Scottish Executive and British Government, signed “The Edinburgh Agreement’ on 15 October, 2012, which
granted constitutional legitimacy to the referendum later held on 18 September, 2014. No such agreement has
existed regarding both Catalan and Spanish governments, and the Generalitat opted to organise unilaterally the
public consultation claiming that the Catalan citizenship had the democratic right to decide according to the following
wording and sequence of questions: “(a) Do you want Catalonia to become a State? (Yes/No); If the answer is in the
affirmative: (b) Do you want this State to be independent? (Yes/No). You can only answer the question under Letter
(b) in the event of having answered “Yes” to the question under Letter (a)”.
It is nonsense to impede or curtail self-government in stateless nations such as Catalonia and Scotland in a political
union like the EU. The EU proclaims territorial subsidiarity as the guiding principle for policy-making by establishing
that decisions are to be taken supranationally only if the state, substate and local layers of government are not
better equipped to implement them. Likewise, it would be misguided not to observe punctiliously the European tenet
for democratic accountability, which applies to the legitimacy of all multi-governance institutions based on the rule of
law. Political discussion, negotiation and eventual agreement are thus necessary and sufficient conditions. The
alternative is anomie and dissolution.
Please read our comments policy before commenting .
Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor
of the London School of Economics.
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